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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

t

Plaintiff/Appellee

:

v.

s

REX PAUL TAYLOR,

t

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 900501-CA

Priority No. 2

:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from convictions for possession of a
controlled substance (marijuana) with intent to distribute, a
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(1)(a)(iv) (1990), and possession of marijuana without a tax
stamp affixed, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 59-19-106(2) (Supp. 1990).

This Court has jurisdiction to

hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp.
1990).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The issues presented in this appeal are:
1.

Did the trial court properly admit, under rules 403 and

404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, facts of defendant's prior arrest
to prove defendant's plan, knowledge, and identity?

Evidentiary

questions are reviewed on appeal under a correction of error
standard; but, the trial court's subsidiary factual
determinations will be given deference and reversed only if

clearly erroneous.

State v. Ramirez, No. 880425/ amended slip

op. at 10-11 n.3 (Utah April 23, 1991).
2.

Did the trial court properly exercise its

discretion in denying defendant's motion to dismiss based on a
claim of insufficient evidence?

A denial of a motion to dismiss

for insufficient evidence will only be reviewed to determine if
the state presented some evidence to establish each element of
the crimes charged.

State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 1225 (Utah

1989).
3.

Did the trial court properly conclude that

defendant failed to establish a legitimate expectation of privacy
in a third-party's cabin such that he lacked standing to contest
the validity of a search warrant for the cabin?
Even if defendant had standing to contest the search,
did the trial court properly conclude that based on the "totality
of the circumstances," there existed probable cause for the
issuance of the search warrant?

The magistrate's probable cause

determination will be upheld if a substantial basis exists for
its finding based on the totality of the facts contained in the
affidavit.

State v. Babell, 770 P.2d 987, 991 (Utah 1989); State

v. Collard, No. 900246-CA, slip. op. at 3 (Utah Ct. App. April
22, 1991).
4.

Did the admission into evidence of defendant's

prior "crimes, wrongs or acts" pursuant to rule 404(b), Utah
Rules of Evidence, violate defendant's fifth amendment rights
under either the doctrine of collateral estoppel or double
-2-

jeopardy?

This is a matter of law, reviewable on appeal under a

correction of error standard.

City of Monticello v. Christensen,

788 P.2d 513, 516 (Utah), cert, denied. 111 S.Ct. 120 (1990).
5.

Did the trial court properly admit into evidence the

prior inconsistent statements of a witness under rule 801(d)(1),
Utah Rules of Evidence?

As an evidentiary matter, the court's

ruling is reviewable on appeal under the standard enunciated in
paragraph 1, above.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The applicable statutes, constitutional provisions and rules
for a determination of this case are, in pertinent part:
U.S. Const, amend. V:
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning —
Due process of law and just compensation
clauses.]
No person shall be held to answer for a
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless
on a presentment or indictment of a Grand
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or
naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public
danger; nor shall any person be subject for
the same offence to be twice in double
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself, nor be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just
compensation.
Utah R. Evid. 103. Rulings on evidence:
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may
not be predicated upon a ruling which admits
or excludes evidence unless a substantial
right of the party is affected, and
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is
one admitting evidence, a timely objection or
motion to strike appears of record, stating

-3-

the specific ground of objection, if the
specific ground was not apparent from the
context; or
(2) Offer of proof. In case the ruling
is one excluding evidence, the substance
which shows the character of the evidence,
the form in which it was offered, the
objection made, and the ruling thereon. It
may direct the making of an offer in question
and answer form.
(b) Record of offer and ruling. The court
may add any other or further statement which
shows the character of the evidence, the form
in which it was offered, the objection made,
and the ruling thereon. It may direct the
making of an offer in question and answer
form.
(c) Hearing of jury. In jury cases,
proceedings shall be conducted, to the extend
practicable, so as to prevent inadmissible
evidence from being suggested to the jury by
any means, such as making statements or
offers of proof or asking questions in the
hearing of the jury.
(d) Plain error. Nothing in this rule
precludes taking notice of plain errors
affecting substantial rights although they
were not brought to the attention of the
court.
Utah R. Evid 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on
grounds of prejudice, confusion, or waste of time:
Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of
undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.
Utah R. Evid. 404. Character evidence not admissible
to prove conduct; exceptions; other crimes.
(b) Other crimesr wrongs, or acts.
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is
not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show that he acted in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be
admissible for other purposes, such as proof
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
-4-

plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident.
Utah R. Evid. 801. Definitions:
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A
statement is not hearsay if:
(1) Prior statement by witness. The
declarant testifies at the trial or hearing
and is subject to cross-examination
concerning the statement and the statement is
(A) inconsistent with his testimony or the
witness denies having made the statement or
has forgotten, or (B) consistent with his
testimony and is offered to rebut an express
or implied charge against him of recent
fabrication or improper influence or motive,
or (C) one of identification of a person made
after perceiving him.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Rex Paul Taylor, was charged with possession of a
controlled substance (marijuana) with intent to distribute, a
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(1)(a)(iv) (1990), and possession of marijuana without a tax
stamp affixed, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 59-19-106(2) (Supp. 1990) (R. 1-3). On June 27 and 29,
1990, a jury trial was held before the Honorable Boyd L. Park,
Fourth Judicial District Court, Wasatch County, State of Utah (R.
164-70).

On June 29th, the jury returned guilty verdicts as

charged (R. 179). On August 31, 1990, defendant was sentenced to
concurrent statutory indeterminate terms of zero to five years in
the Utah State Prison (R. 222-23).

Defendant filed a notice of

appeal on September 5, 1990 (R. 233).
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In July, 1988, Gil Marchbanks purchased a mountain lot
located in the Timberlakes area of Wasatch County, Utah
(Suppression Hearing Transcript, hereafter referred to as S.T.,
at 18; Trial Transcript, hereafter referred to as T., at 116-18)•
The next month, Marchbanks was granted permission to erect a
vacation cabin on the lot (T. 120). He listed defendant, Rex
Taylor, as the contractor (T. 120-21).

The multi-level cabin was

completed in the fall of 1988 (T. 42, 162).
On May 11, 1989, a search warrant was executed on the
Timberlakes cabin (T. 37). The cabin was fully furnished and
contained numerous personal effects and clothing (T. 39, 43).
Rounds of ammunition were on the window sills (T. 39). No one
was found in the cabin.
The police found two large locked safes in the basement.

In

the first safe, thirty-six (36) pounds of marijuana were found
(T. 102). Approximately twenty (20) pounds of the marijuana were
in a large bag marked with its weight (T. 102). The rest was
packaged in one pound amounts in individual Ziploc bags (T. 10406).

The other safe contained marijuana residue (T. 107).

No

Utah tax stamps were affixed to the marijuana (T. 110).
In the utility room of the cabin, one opened and thirteen
(13) unopened boxes of two (2) gallon Ziploc storage bags were
found (T. 58-59).

The Ziploc bags were identical to those used

in packaging the individual one pound marijuana bags found in the
basement safe (T. 106). A triple beam scale, commonly used in
-6-

measuring controlled substances, was found in the kitchen (T. 9798).

Small amounts of marijuana and marijuana residue were found

throughout the cabin (T. 68, 83, 87-88, 98).
Numerous documents were found in the cabin.

These included:

1) a receipt made out to defendant for the purchase of
$870.00 worth of furniture for the cabin (Exhibit 2;
T.44);
2) various receipts made out to defendant for the
purchase of propane gas for the cabin, including one
indicating that defendant had paid $2,200.00 in cash on
the account (Exhibit 7; T. 59-60);
3) various receipts made out to defendant related to
the purchase of construction materials which indicated
that when payments were made, cash was paid in the
amounts of $550.00 and $1000.00 (Exhibit 10; T. 69-71);
4) a 1988 Utah hunting license issued to defendant
(Exhibit 8; T. 61); and,
5) the 1989 Utah registration and decal stickers for
two 1988 Yamaha snowmobiles issued to defendant, which
registration matched in description two snowmobiles
found in the basement of the cabin (Exhibit 9; T. 717 2); and
6) various documents relating to the purchase of the
lot by Gil Marchbanks, including two receipts
indicating that the closing costs of $3,123.77 and
water hookup and excavation costs of $2250.00 had been
paid in cash (Exhibits 5 and 6; T. 114-120).
While some of the cabins in the Timberlakes area had year
around access, this cabin did not.

It was located on a dirt road

which was not cleared in the winter months (T. 154, 157).
Because of its relative isolation, other residents could not see
when individuals were at the cabin (T. 159). However, two of the
year-round residents, the Oteros, were familiar with Gil
Marchbanks and defendant since Mr. Otero worked on the cabin as a
subcontractor.

Mrs. Otero thought that aside from their business
-7-

relationship that Marchbanks and defendant appeared to be friends
(T. 156). In fact, defendant and Marchbanks were living together
in Las Vegas, Nevada at the time (Exhibit 39 at 3).
According to defendant's girlfriend, Vickie Tooke,
defendant frequently used the cabin (T. 199). Prior to the
search in May, defendant was last observed at the cabin in the
fall of 1988. However, in December, 1988, defendant and Gil
Marchbanks were seen at the gate to the Timberlakes area (T.
162).
Approximately one month prior to the search, around late
March or early April, 1989, defendant called Anita Otero to ask
her if the road to the cabin was accessible.
told him to call her husband (T. 156-57).

She was unsure and

Defendant then called

Tom Otero at work and asked if the road was passable to the cabin
because defendant wanted to get his Jet Ski which was stored
there.

Mr. Otero told him that it was not yet passable (T. 164).

Twelve days prior to the search of the cabin, a police
narcotics team conducted surveillance of defendant in Utah County
(T. 123-24). On April 29, 1989, the police observed defendant as
he drove to various locations in Utah County and met with
individuals for brief encounters.

Throughout the surveillance,

defendant drove a small pickup truck with an attached trailer.
The trailer was carrying the same Jet Ski which defendant had
previously told Tom Otero was stored at the Timberlakes cabin.1
1

Kevin Williams, a friend of defendant's, testified that
defendant had called him around early March and asked if he would
go to the cabin and get the Jet Ski. Williams claimed that he
-8-

The surveillance culminated in defendant's arrest for
distribution of marijuana in Utah County.

At the time of his

arrest, defendant had in his possession fourteen pounds of
marijuana, a ledger notebook which contained entries consistent
with the distribution of marijuana in pound amounts/ and
approximately $25,000.00 in small bills (T. 141, 149, 192).2
The packaging of the marijuana found in defendant's
possession on April 29th was identical to that found in the
Timberlakes cabin on May 11th.

In both cases, the marijuana was

packaged in one pound amounts in two gallon Ziploc bags.

In both

cases, the individual marijuana packages were placed in identical
larger bags.

Identical boxes of the Ziploc bags were found near

both marijuana seizures (T. 144-45)-

Additionally, the ledger

book contained notations indicating that defendant iiai been
selling one pound amounts of marijuana to "Gil" (T. 189).
After his arrest in Utah County, defendant returned to Las
Vegas, Nevada, where he was residing with his girlfriend, Vickie
Tooke, and Gil Marchbanks.

He returned to Utah about a week

later, approximately four days before the execution of the search
warrant in Wasatch County (T. 294-95, 280, 282). There is no
went to the cabin two or three weeks later, around the end of
March or beginning of April, and retrieved the Jet Ski (T. 273276). This would have been at the same time period that Tom
Otero testified the road to the cabin was impassable.
2

On January 25, 1990, prior to trial in the instant case,
defendant pled guilty in Utah County to a single count of
distribution of marijuana relating to the April 29th sale of
drugs to Bryant Collard (R. 188-90). Contrary to the assertion
in defendant's brief, direct evidence of the plea and conviction
were never admitted into evidence in this trial.
-9-

dispute that defendant was not at the cabin at the time of the
search.
When Vickie Tooke was subsequently told by her lawyer that
thirty-six (36) pounds of marijuana had been discovered by the
police on May 11th at the Timberlakes cabin, she became very
upset and confronted defendant.
pot was coming from."

She asked defendant where "the

Defendant told her that on April 29th# the

day of his arrest in Utah County, he had picked up the marijuana
from an individual known as Reuben Martinez in the Park City area
(T. 226-27; Exhibit 39 at 6; Exhibit 40 at 1-2).3
Other facts will be discussed in the body of t.his brief as
pertinent to the individual argument.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Based on the facts of this case, the trial court properly
admitted evidence of defendant's prior arrest for purposes of
establishing defendant's plan, preparation, knowledge and
identity as the constructive possessor of the marijuana in
question.

Under rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, the prior

bad acts of defendant were factually probative of a contested
issue; and, under rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, this
probativeness was not substantially outweighed by the prejudicial
impact of the evidence.

Further, the admission of the 404(b)

3

Vickie Tooke attempted to recant this statement at trial (T.
200).
She was impeached with her prior written and taped
statements to the police (T« 203, 206, 217, 225-26).
A more
complete discussion of Tooke's testimony will be presented in Point
V of this brief relating to the admission of exhibits 39 and 40,
her prior statements.
-10-

evidence did not violate defendant's fifth amendments rights
under either the doctrine of collateral estoppel or double
jeopardy.
Because the state established some evidence of each element
of the crimes charged, the trial court properly denied
defendant's motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence.
Defendant failed to establish any legitimate expectation of
privacy in the third-party's cabin which was searched.

The trial

court, therefore, properly found that defendant lacked standing
to contest the validity of the search warrant.

Even if defendant

had standing, the trial court correctly concluded that a
substantial basis existed to support the magistrate's
determination that probable cause existed for the issuance of the
warrant.
Pursuant to rule 801(d)(1), the trial court properly allowed
a witness to be impeached with her prior inconsistent statements.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED, PURSUANT TO RULES
403 AND 404(B), UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE, FACTS OF
DEFENDANT'S PRIOR ARREST TO ESTABLISH HIS KNOWLEDGE,
PLAN, PREPARATION AND IDENTITY.
Defendant moved in limine

to exclude, pursuant to rule 609,

Utah Rules of Evidence, the fact of defendant's conviction for
distribution of a controlled substance arising out of his April
29, 1989, arrest in Utah County, and to exclude, pursuant to rule
404, Utah Rules of Evidence, evidence seized during that arrest,
specifically his ledger and notebook evidencing drug transactions
-11-

(R. 105-10).

In reply, the state argued that the facts of

defendant's possession of marijuana twelve days prior the instant
offense was probative of defendant's intent, plan, preparation,
knowledge and identity as the constructive possessor of the
marijuana in the cabin (R. 125-32).

Based on rule 404(b), Utah

Rules of Evidence, the trial court found the evidence of
defendant's prior possession of marijuana was probative of his
identity as the person having constructive possession of the
questioned marijuana and probative of his intent, plan and
preparation in possessing the marijuana (T. 13-14).

As such, the

court correctly applied the balancing test of rule 403, Utah
Rules of Evidence, and found the evidence admissible (T. 11-12,
14-15).
Defendant now claims that the court improperly focused on
rule 609 and commingled it with considerations of rules 403 and
404 (Br. of App. at 12). This is an incorrect reading of the
record.

The trial court clearly and primarily considered the

admission of the evidence found during defendant's arrest on
April 29th under rule 404(b) (T. 3-15; R. 106-10, 125-32).

The

issue was whether the state could introduce the circumstances and
evidence of defendant's arrest in its case-in-chief (T. 7-9).
Only as a secondary consideration did the court consider whether
or not evidence of defendant's conviction was also admissible as
impeachment evidence if defendant testified (T. 14-15).

In this

regard, the court noted that since drug convictions are not
automatically classified as crimes of dishonesty, the conviction
-12-

itself could only be admissible for impeachment purposes if its
probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect (T. 13-15).
See Utah R. Evid. 609(a)(1).
Consistent with this ruling, the jury was never informed
that defendant had pled guilty or was convicted of the April 29th
offense.

This was clearly recognized by defendant's counsel/

When the state rested in its case-in-chief, defense counsel
informed the court that defendant would not be testifying because
under the court's ruling, if defendant did testify, the prior
plea and conviction would be admissible impeachment (T. 271).
Similarly, when defense counsel moved post-trial for a
certificate of probable cause, defendant referred to the trial
court's admission of the prior bad acts evidence only under rules
403 and 404(b) (T. 3). Thus, while defendant may have initially
raised an objection to the admission of the evidence under rule
609, its actual admission at trial was based solely on rule
404(b) grounds.

Under these circumstances, defendant has failed

to preserve any issue relevant to rule 609.

State v. Gentry, 747

P.2d 1032, 1086 (Utah 1987) ("[t]o preserve for appellate review
a claim of improper impeachment with a prior conviction, a
defendant must testify").
Turning to consideration of the admission of the evidence in
the state's case-in-chief under rules 403 and 404(b), the Utah
Supreme Court has recently clarified that evidentiary rulings are

A

Defendant's trial counsel is also his current appellate
counsel.
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rulings of law, reviewable on appeal for correctness•

State v,

Ramirez, No. 880425, amended slip op. at 10 n.3 (Utah April 23,
1991).

However, in reviewing such claims, especially those which

balance the "probativeness of a piece of evidence against its
potential for unfair prejudice," the appellate courts must "de
facto grant [the trial court] some discretion, because [the
appellate court will] reverse only if . . .
acted unreasonably in striking the balance."

[the trial court]
j[ci. at 11 n.3.

Similarly, the trial court's subsidiary factual determinations
will be given deference by the appellate court and should only be
overruled when clearly erroneous. .Id.. Even when evidence is
found to be improperly admitted, reversal is only mandated where
the admission of the evidence constituted prejudicial error.
State v, Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 1225 (Utah 1989); State v.
Larson, 775 P.2d 415, 419 (Utah 1989); State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d
at 1035.
Rule 404(b) is a rule of inclusion.

State v. Jamison, 767

P.2d 134, 137 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

Accord United States v. Day,

591 F.2d 861, 871 (D.C. Cir. 1978).

Evidence of prior acts is

admissible if relevant to prove an element of the crime, unless
under rule 403, the evidence's probative value is "substantially
outweighed'1 by its prejudicial effect, id.; State v. Wareham,
772 P.2d 960, 963 (Utah 1989).

See also Bovce, Utah Rules of

Evidence, 85 Utah L. Rev. 63, 84 (1985).

But within the general

rule, the Utah appellate courts have scrutinized rule 404(b)
admissions for their potential prejudicial effect.
-14-

State v.

Rocco,

795 P.2d 1116, 1118-19 (Utah 1990) (harmless error to

admit prior and subsequent bad acts that were not probative of
any issue; no error to admit prior bad acts "reflective of the
absence of mistake or accident, motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, or identity"); State v. Gotschall,
782 P.2d 459, 462-63 (Utah 1989) (no error to admit evidence of
another crime to show defendant's state of mind and dispute
defendant's claim of self-defense); State v. Florez, 777 P.2d
452, 456-57 (Utah 1989) (evidence of other crime admissible to
prove element of crime but error to admit in guilt phase); State
v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424, 427-428 (Utah 1989) (harmless error
to admit evidence of other crimes where only minimally probative
of intent); State v. Johnson, 784 P.2d 1135, 1141-42 (Utah 1989)
(harmless error to admit theft crime under rule 609(a), Utah
Rules of Evidence; but, no error to admit evidence of other
crimes under rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence); State v.
Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 295-96 (Utah 1988) (evidence of other
crimes admissible to establish defendant's intent); State v.
Morrell, 149 Utah Adv. Rep. 26, 27-28 (Utah Ct. App. Nov. 30,
1990) (other crimes evidence admissible to prove a contested
material element such as intent); State v. Jamison, 767 P.2d at
137 (evidence of other crimes admissible to show opportunity and
knowledge of technique used to commit crime).
In this regard, it is important to recognize what defendant
is not claiming.

Defendant is not contending that any of the

facts introduced into evidence were unreliable or contested.
-15-

Defendant stood convicted of the offense of distribution by his
plea of guilty.

Nor does defendant assert that the trial court

misconstrued the legal requisites for admitting evidence under
rules 403 and 404(b).

Defendant does not even really argue that

the court improperly balanced the evidence's probative value with
its prejudicial effect.

Instead, defendant asserts that the

evidence from the prior arrest lacked any probative value and for
that reason should not have been characterized as 404(b) evidence
in the first place (Br. of App. at 19-20).

Defendant improperly

asserts that "[t]he only purpose of the evidence [was] to
persuade the jury that the [d]efendant was a drug dealer of long
duration and therefore must have been the person who possessed
the marijuana in the Timberlakes cabin in Wasatch County" (Br. of
App. at 20). Thus, defendant's argument is not with the trial
court's ultimate legal conclusion that, applying the balancing
test of rule 403, the evidence was admissible.

Rather, defendant

is challenging the trial court's initial ruling, under rule
404(b), that the evidence was factually probative to the
resolution of the issues in the case, that is, that the evidence
was factually "relevant."

See Utah R. Evid. 402 ("'Relevant

evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence.").
Because defendant was not the title owner of the Timberlakes
cabin and was not present when the marijuana was found, the state
-16-

was required to prove defendant's constructive possession of the
drugs through circumstantial evidence.

State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d

127, 132 (Utah 1987); State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 318-19 (Utah
1985); State v. Carlson, 635 P.2d 72, 74 (Utah 1981).

Even if

the jury believed that defendant knowingly had access to the
marijuana in the cabin, it was still necessary for the state to
prove that defendant had the "intent to make use of that
knowledge and ability.1'

Fox, 709 P.2d at 319.

For, the state

had the burden of establishing that "there was a sufficient nexus
between the accused and the drug to permit an inference that the
accused had both the power and the intent to exercise dominion
and control over the drug."

Id.

Here, the presence of cash receipts in defendant's name for
furniture and gas purchases for the cabin, the presence of
defendant's hunting license, the presence of defendant's
snowmobiles in the cabin, and the storage of his Jet Ski in the
cabin all inferentially established defendant's access to and
control of the cabin.

This evidence was further supported by the

testimony of Tom Otero and Vickie Tooke.

However, the state's

evidence did not establish that defendant had exclusive control
over the cabin or fully establish his knowledge and intent of the
marijuana concealed there.

The facts and circumstances of

defendant's possession of substantial amounts of similarly
packaged marijuana only twelve days prior to the discovery of
marijuana in the cabin were highly probative of this issue.

-17-

The state did not argue that because defendant was illegally
distributing marijuana on April 29th that the jury could infer
his guilt in the instant offense.
state's

Just the opposite.

At the

request, a cautionary instruction was given to the jury

which read:
During this trial, evidence has been received that
the Defendant was engaged in other crimes, wrongs or
acts in connection with his arrest in Provo, Utah on
April 29, 1989. Under the Rules of Evidence of the
State of Utah, you are instructed and cautioned that
such evidence is not to be considered by you for the
purpose of proving that he acted in conformity
therewith in connection with the incident which is the
subject matter of this trial.
However, such evidence is admissible and may be
considered by you for other purposes, including proof
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
(R. 159). During the state's closing argument, the* prosecutor
reminded the jury that they could not "consider [the other crimes
evidence] to show acting and conformity [sic] but there is a lot
of reasons why in this case it is relevant.

It shows conduct

that is relevant to motive, to plan, to operation[,] to his
identity as being in fact the one who constructively possessed
the [m]arijuana in that cabin" (T. 305).
The probativeness of the evidence of defendant's arrest was
derived from the facts that:
1. Within
possession
thirty-six
access and

a twelve day period, defendant was found in
of fourteen pounds of marijuana and another
pounds were found in a cabin to which he had
at which he stored personal items;

2. In both cases, the marijuana was packaged in one
pound packages contained in two gallon Ziploc bags and
placed in identical larger storage bags;
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3. In both cases, identical boxes of the two gallon
Ziploc bags were found with the marijuana;
4. At the time of his arrest, defendant was trailing a
Jet Ski which had been stored at the cabin until just
shortly before defendant's arrest;
5. The ledger book and large amount of cash in small
bills found in defendant's truck when he was arrested
on April 29th, established that defendant was involved
in the distribution of marijuana in amounts consistent
with a need to store thirty-six pounds of marijuana
while delivering another fourteen pounds;
6. The ledger book also listed "Gil" as a pound
customer of defendant's, which was probative of whether
Gil Marchbanks, the title owner of the cabin, would
have been storing large amounts of marijuana in the
cabin and yet purchasing pound amounts from defendant.
Certainly, drug packaging and distribution are not necessarily
singular type crimes.

But the combined similarities,

together with their reasonable inferences, created circumstantial
evidence relevant to the jury's determination of the identity of
defendant as the person having constructive possession of the
marijuana in the cabin. State v. Rocco, 795 P.2d at 1119; State
v. Morrell, 149 Utah Adv. Rep. at 28; State v. Shaffer, 725 P.2d
1301, 1309 (Utah 1986).
In addition to the evidence of his arrest, defendant also
asserts that the trial court improperly admitted into evidence,
pursuant to rule 404(b), Vickie Tooke's interviews with the
police and defendant's prior conviction for distribution (Br. of
App. at 19). This is incorrect. As discussed above, defendant's
conviction was never admitted into evidence.5

Further, Vickie

Tooke's statements were not admitted under rule 404(b), but as
5

See page 12 of this brief for discussion.
..19.

prior inconsistent statements under rule 801(d)(1), Utah Rules of
Evidence (T. 201-04, 255). The propriety of that admission will
be discussed under Point V of this brief*
POINT II
THE COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
WHERE THE STATE PRESENTED SOME EVIDENCE OF EACH ELEMENT
OF THE CRIME CHARGED.
At the end of the state's case-in-chief, defendant moved for
a dismissal, claiming that the state had failed to establish any
evidence that defendant had constructive possession of the drugs
found in the Timberlakes cabin (T. 256-60).

The motion was

denied (T. 271). Contrary to the assertion in his brief,
defendant did not renew the motion at the end of the case (T.
300-01; R. 168-69).

Rather, the court took under advisement

defendant's motion to dismiss but only as to defendant's claim of
double jeopardy and collateral estoppel (T. 329, 329; R. 170).
This was subsequently denied (R. 191-93).
On appeal, defendant does not claim that the evidence, taken
as a whole, is insufficient to support his convictions.

Instead,

he limits his argument to a claim of error based on the court's
denial of his mid-trial motion to dismiss for insufficient
evidence.

In the context of this case, defendant's argument is

simply that the state failed to make out a prima

facie

case in

its case-in-chief.
In reviewing a prima

facie

claim, the trial court's denial

must be upheld "if, upon reviewing the evidence and all
inferences that can be reasonably drawn from it, [the appellate
-20-

court] concludefs] that some evidence exists from which a
reasonable jury could find that the elements of the crime had
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt."

State v. Dibello, 780

P.2d 1221, 1225 (Utah 1989).
Here, defendant makes no claim that the court improperly
construed the elements of either the crime of possession with
intent to distribute or of possession of marijuana without a tax
stamp affixed.

Certainly, there can be no serious dispute that

possession of thirty-six pounds of marijuana, packaged in one
pound amounts, evidences an intent to distribute or that the
requisite tax stamps were not affixed to the marijuana.

Nor does

defendant contend that a person must be physically on the
premises to show that person's possession.
The dispute was simply who had committed the crime, i.e.,
who had knowledge, control and an intent to distribute the
marijuana found in the cabin. Aside from the rule 404(b)
evidence discussed in Point I, Vickie Tooke testified that she
had told the police that defendant admitted that he got the
marijuana in the cabin from Reuben Martinez. While Ms. Tooke
attempted to recant the voluntariness of her prior statement, the
legitimacy of her disclaimer was a credibility issue for the jury
to resolve. State v. Hopkins, 782 P.2d 475, 477 (Utah 1989);
State v. Lactod, 761 P.2d 23, 28 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Based on the evidence presented in the state's case-inchief, the trial court properly denied defendant's motion to
dismiss for insufficient evidence.
1225.

State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d at

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT DEFENDANT HAD
FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT HE HAD A LEGITIMATE
EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN THE TIMBERLAKES CABIN SUCH
THAT HE LACKED STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE SEARCH
WARRANT; AND, EVEN IF DEFENDANT HAD STANDING, THE TRIAL
COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT A SUBSTANTIAL BASIS
EXISTED TO SUPPORT THE ISSUANCE OF THE SEARCH WARRANT
FOR THE TIMBERLAKES CABIN.
It is axiomatic that "[t]he proponent of a motion to
suppress has the burden of establishing that his own Fourth
Amendment rights were violated by the challenged search or
seizure."

Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 130, 131 n.l (1978).

Constitutional protections against unlawful search and seizure
are personal rights such that
[a] person who is aggrieved by an illegal search and
seizure only through the introduction of damaging
evidence secured by a search of a third person's
premises or property has not had any of his Fourth
Amendment rights infringed.
Id. at 135 (citing Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174
(1969)).

Utah appellate courts have recognized this same

prerequisite to suppression.

State v. Constantinor 732 P.2d 125,

126-27 (Utah 1987); State v. lacono, 725 P.2d 1375, 1377-78 (Utah
1986); State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d 1334, 1335 (Utah 1984); State v.
Grueber, 776 P.2d 70, 73 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 783 P.2d
53 (1989); State v. DeAlo, 748 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah Ct. App.
1987).
Here, defendant challenged the search warrant executed on
the cabin of a third party, Gil Marchbanks.

In his memorandum in

support of his motion to suppress, defendant alleged that he had
a legitimate expectation of privacy in the Timberlakes cabin
"because he had supplied labor and materials in the construction

of the cabin on the property and also enjoyed the use of the
premises from time to time" (R. 74). The state challenged
defendant's claim of standing (R. 43-47, 89-94).
During the evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress,
defendant called three witnesses, none of which asserted that
defendant had any proprietary, possessory or permissive use of
the cabin (S.T. 2-18).

The state moved the court to take

judicial notice of a civil forfeiture action for the cabin in
which defendant filed an affidavit asserting that he was not the
title owner.

The affidavit stated that the only interest that

defendant had in the property was as a contractor and that he had
occasionally used the premises (R. 67-68).
Based on this evidence, the trial court properly concluded
that defendant had failed to establish any legitimate expectation
of privacy in the cabin at the time of the search (R. 99-101).
As such, defendant lacked standing to challenge the warrant.
Accord United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 91-92 (1980)
(overruling automatic standing doctrine); Rakas v. Illinois, 439
U.S. at 426 (passenger of a vehicle lacked standing to challenge
the automobile's search); State v. Constantino, 732 P.2d at 12627 (defendant failed to establish standing where he presented no
evidence as to his permissive use of another's vehicle); State v.
Iacono, 725 P.2d at 1377 (defendant lacked standing where he
presented no evidence as to his ownership, permissive use

or

possession of his mother's trailer); State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d at
1335 (defendant who denied any interest in the vehicle searched
lacked standing); State v. Purcell, 586 P.2d 441, 443 (Utah 1978)
(possession of stolen property alone is insufficient to confer

standing); State v. Grueber, 776 P.2d at 73-74 (no standing where
vehicle and gun searched and seized were registered to
defendant's girlfriend); State v. DeAlo, 748 P.2d at 196
(officer's subjective belief as to defendant's permissive use of
vehicle irrelevant to determination of standing where only
evidence was that defendant was a passenger).

See also Barrett

v. State, 105 Nev. 361, 775 P.2d 1276, 1277 (1989) (periodic
presence in an apartment of another, even when coupled with a
single monetary contribution for "expenses", does not confer
standing to object to search of the apartment generally).
Even if this Court were to consider the merits of
defendant's claim, the affidavit in support of the search warrant
for the Timberlakes cabin was sufficient to support the
magistrate's finding of probable cause.
The Utah appellate courts have clearly recognized:
Both the Utah Constitution, article I, section 14, and
the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution
require that issuance of search warrants be based upon
'probable cause supported by oath or affirmation.'
Whether an affidavit for a search warrant meets the
probable-cause standard is determined by the 'totality
of the circumstances' analysis of Illinois v. Gates,
462 U.S. 213 (1983). In a line of cases beginning with
State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1983), the Utah
Supreme Court adopted the Gates standard. Factors to
be considered include, among others, the veracity,
reliability, and basis of knowledge of confidential
informants, and whether the judicial officer issuing
the warrant reached a practical, common sense decision.
State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127 (Utah 1987). The weight
accorded these factors may vary according to the
circumstances. State v. Bailey, 675 P.2d 1203 (Utah
1984).
State v. Avala, 762 P.2d 1107, 1109-10 (Utah Ct. App. 1988),
cert, denied, 773 P.2d 45 (1989).

Accord State v. Babbell, 770

P.2d 987, 990-91 (Utah 1989); State v. Miller, 740 P.2d 1363,

1365 (Utah Ct. App.)/ cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987);
State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 1101 (Utah 1985).
In reviewing an affidavit, an appellate court is not to
conduct a de novo proceeding.

State v. Collard, No. 900246-CA,

slip op. at 3 (Utah Ct. App. April 22, 1991) (citing Rakas v.
Illinois, 462 U.S. at 236, and State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d at
991).

Rather, the issue is whether the affidavit, taken as a

whole, provides a substantial basis for the lower court's finding
of probable cause. Id..; State v. Stromberg, 783 P. 2d 54, 57
(Utah Ct. App. 1989).

To preserve the integrity of the warrant,

deference should be given to the trial court's probable cause
ruling.

Id.

Contrary to defendant's assertions, the affidavit in the
instant case is clearly sufficient.

When taken as a whole, the

affidavit established that defendant had been arrested on April
29th in Utah County with fourteen (14) pounds of marijuana and
$25,000.00 in cash in small bills (R. 54-55).

On the same day,

defendant's home in Provo was searched and evidence of marijuana
and paraphernalia for its distribution were found (T. 54-55).
Defendant's live-in girlfriend, Vickie Tooke, told the police
that defendant was spending substantially more money than he
earned legitimately (T. 54). Another individual arrested the
same day told the police that he had been given his marijuana by
defendant (T. 55). One week after defendant's arrest, the police
received an unsigned letter asserting that defendant had a cabin
in the Heber, Utah area (T. 55). Two days later, a relative of
defendant's called the police to tell them that defendant had
requested the relative to go to a cabin in the Heber area and

retrieve a large amount of cash accumulated from the illegal
distribution of drugs (T. 55). The relative told the police that
the cabin was not titled in defendant's name (T. 55). This
information was consistent with documents found in the search of
defendant's Provo home on April 29th which indicated that
defendant had paid the property taxes for a cabin in the
Timberlakes development, east of Heber.

A subsequent records

search established that the same cabin was titled in the name of
Gil Marchbanks, a known associate of defendant's (T. 55).
Instead of focusing on the totality of these facts,
defendant dissects each paragraph of the affidavit, reading each
in isolation and artificially.

For example, defendant complains

that the statement that defendant possessed $25,000.00 in cash at
the time of his arrest is insufficient because it does not
specify if the money was on his person or in his truck (Br. of
App. at 31). Such "a grudging or negative attitude . . . is
inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment's strong preference for
searches conducted pursuant

to a warrant."

State v. Collard,

slip op. at 3 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at 236).
Defendant also argues that one paragraph of the affidavit,
paragraph 11, contains a false statement such that the paragraph
should be disregarded (Br. of App. at 33-34).6
6

However,

Paragraph 11 reads:
That a review of financial records seized from the
residence owned by Rex Paul Taylor at the time of his
arrest on April 29, 1989 show that Rex has been paying
the property taxes on lot #1723 at Timber Lake
Subdivision, plot 16 east of Heber in Wasatch County.
(R. 73). During the subsequent evidentiary hearing, a police
officer testified that he found a property tax receipt for the
cabin in defendant's name (S.T. 9-10). However, the records of the
deputy assessor for Wasatch County did not show any payments from

defendant never made this argument to the trial court and has,
therefore, waived the issue.

State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660

(Utah 1985).
But, even if the issue had been preserved, defendant
misconstrues the Franks v. Delaware7 doctrine. A court need not
disregard every statement in an affidavit which is subsequently
proven to be false.

Rather, such statements may be disregarded

when a defendant establishes, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that the false and material statement was made intentionally and
knowingly or with reckless disregard for the truth.

State v.

Miller, 740 P.2d 1363, 1366-67 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 765
P.2d 1277 (1987), (citing State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188 (Utah
1986), cert, denied, 480 U.S. 930 (1987)).

Even on appeal,

defendant has made no such allegation.
POINT IV
THE ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE UNDER RULE 404(B), UTAH RULES
OF EVIDENCE, IS NOT BARRED BY THE FIFTH AMENDMENT UNDER
EITHER THE DOCTRINE OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL OR DOUBLE
JEOPARDY.
Defendant contends that the admission of evidence derived
from his prior arrest violated the doctrine of collateral
estoppel and placed him twice in jeopardy for the same crime.8
Significantly, defendant does not assert that the state was
barred from prosecuting him for both the Utah and Wasatch County
offenses or that the two offenses were part of a single criminal
defendant (T. 17-18). At trial, Vickie Tooke testified that she
paid several bills for the cabin (T. 199).
7
8

438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978).

Defendant has only raised this issue based on federal law
and has not argued for a separate state constitutional analysis.

episode as defined under Utah Code Ann, § 76-1-403 (1990).

Both

below and on appeal, defendant has consistently argued that it is
the state's use of the evidence derived from the April 29th
incident which is precluded by federal due process, but not the
prosecutions or convictions themselves (R. 185-86; T. 15; Br. of
App. at 39). Defendant, therefore, presents the limited issue of
whether the fifth amendment restricts the use of otherwise
admissible rule 404(b) evidence.9
In rejecting defendant's argument, the trial court properly
relied on Dowlina v. United States, 110 S.Ct. 668, 672-73 (1990),
in which the United States Supreme Court squarely held that
neither double jeopardy nor collateral estoppel barred the use of
rule 404(b) evidence.
of Ms. Vera Henry.

Dowling was acquitted of the home robbery

Subsequently, Dowling was charged with

federal bank robbery arising out of a separate incident.
Pursuant to rule 404(b), Federal Rules of Evidence, the
government called Ms. Henry to testify as to defendant's use of a
mask and specific type of weapon in the acquitted robbery for
purposes of his identification in the second robbery.

In

affirming the conviction, the Supreme Court sspecifically rejected
the argument now made by defendant and held:
[W]e decline to extend Ashe v. Swenson, [397 U.S. 436
(1970)] and the collateral estoppel component of the
Double Jeopardy Clause to exclude in all circumstances,
9

Because defendant concedes that the state was free to
prosecute defendant separately for both the Utah and Wasatch
County offenses, this case does not present the situation
considered in Grady v. Corbin, 110 S. Ct. 2084, 2087 (1990),
relating to when successive prosecutions are permissible
predicated on the "same conduct." Compare United States v*
Felix, 926 F.2d 1522 (10th Cir. 1991), with United States v.
Punqitore, 910 F.2d 1084 (3rd Cir. 1990).

as Dowling would have it, relevant and probative
evidence that is otherwise admissible under the Rules
of Evidence simply because it relates to alleged
criminal conduct for which a defendant has been
acquitted.
Dowling, 110 S.Ct. at 672.
The Court concluded that Ashe and the doctrine of collateral
estoppel only prevent the government from relitigating facts
previously determined adversely to it. Therefore, if the prior
fact finder has not found a specific fact in favor of defendant,
the government can use that evidence in a subsequent prosecution.
Id.
Here, none of the evidence surrounding the April 29th
offense was previously determined in defendant's favor.

Indeed,

he voluntarily pled guilty to distributing drugs on that date.
Nor was his possession of the marijuana, money or ledger book in
dispute.

As such, the reliability of evidence sought to be

admitted was not contested, only its probativeness.

Consistent

with Dowling, the state was not, therefore, collaterally estopped
from using the verified evidence of defendant's prior criminal
acts to bolster its identification of defendant as the
perpetrator of a subsequent crime. .Id., at 673 n.3.
PCINT V
DEFENDANT RECEIVED THE FULL BENEFITS OF HIS PLEA
BARGAIN IN UTAH COUNTY.
Defendant argues that the "effect" of his entering into a
plea bargain for the April 29th offenses in Utah County was that
he "would not have any additional criminal responsibility for the
conduct which was part of the plea agreement and negotiation"
(Br. of App. at 39).

As previously noted, defendant does not

claim that the plea bargain in any way precluded the Wasatch
County prosecution.

Nor does defendant claim that the

prosecutors for either county misrepresented the terms of the
plea bargain or failed to abide by any of its specific terms.
Instead, defendant asserts the unique argument that when the
state enters into a plea bargainf "implicitly" the state agrees
that evidence from any of the other crimes will never be used
against the defendant in any other proceeding.

Logically,

defendant is asserting that the state would be allowed to use
prior evidence and convictions if they resulted from trial
convictions but is precluded when such incidents result in
bargained for guilty pleas.
Defendant attempts to support this argument with citations
to cases imposing an obligation on a prosecutor to fulfill any
promises made to secure a plea (Br. of App. at 39).
this is true.

Certainly,

But here, the record of the Utah County plea

contains no representations concerning the pending Wasatch
action.

The only representation was that the Utah County

prosecutor would dismiss the other Utah County charges, which was
done (R. 188-90).
Defendant and his counsel were fully aware at the time of
the plea that the Wasatch County charges were being actively
pursued.

Despite this, defendant chose to enter into a plea

bargain only with Utah County.

His explicit choice of this

course of action cannot now be used to create an implicit
obligation on the state.

POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE PRIOR
INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS OF A WITNESS UNDER RULE
801(d)(1), UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE.
As has been discussed throughout this brief, Vickie Tooke#
defendant's live-in girlfriend, gave several statements to the
police beginning on the day of defendant's arrest in Utah County
and continuing into May, 1989. These statements confirmed that
defendant was a drug dealer who had received marijuana from
Reuben Martinez on April 29th, some of which was found in
defendant's possession in Utah County and some of which was found
in the Timberlakes cabin in Wasatch County.
Originally, defendant listed Vickie Tooke as an alibi
witness (R. 23). However, at trial, the state called her as a
witness (T.196-7).

Ms. Tooke testified with her counsel present

(T. 196). Because of her reluctance to provide information on
behalf of the state, her continuing involvement with defendant
and their ongoing relationship as parents of a child, Ms. Tooke
was declared to be a hostile witness (T. 202-04).

Under

questioning by the prosecutor, Ms. Tooke attempted to recant her
previous inculpatory statements concerning defendant by claiming
that she had been "coerced and tortured" by the police to provide
the information (T. 206, 209). Contrary to her prior statements,
she denied that defendant told her that he had gotten the
marijuana from Reuben Martinez or that he knew anything about the
marijuana found in the cabin (T. 200). She claimed that she had
made up this information to satisfy the police (T. 206, 209, 21719).

In this context, the state impeached her testimony with her

prior written and taped statements to the police (T. 201-210, T.
221-28).
Initially, defendant objected to the form of the questions
during the impeachment (T. 202-03).

Defendant then argued that

prior inconsistent statements of a witness are hearsay and not
admissible unless against the declarant's interest (T. 204). The
trial court correctly overruled the objection and allowed Ms.
Tooke to be impeached with her prior inconsistent statements (T.
205).

See Utah R. Evid. 801(d)(1).

At the termination of the state's case, the prosecutor moved
for the admission of the state exhibits (T. 246-55.).

In relation

to exhibit 39, Tooke's prior signed statement to the police, and
exhibit 40, Tooke's transcribed prior taped statement to the
police, the following exchange took place:
MR. ESPLIN: Object to both of those exhibits on the
grounds that they constitute hearsay, irrelevant to
this case. That they were made at the time when the
witness who made the statements in her testimony here
is that she was under duress at that time. Therefore
and that the information contained in those exhibits is
not true.
THE COURT:
exhibit?

I don't know what else is contained in that

MS. HUFNAGEL: If there is any extraneous matters those
can be masked but insofar as they pertain.
THE COURT: Insofar as they pertain to those specific
areas in which the witnesses were questioned I will
receive them.
(T. 255). Defendant then proceeded to put on his case.
further discussion of the exhibits took place.
subsequently convicted.
(R. 222-23).

No

Defendant was

Sentencing occurred on August 31, 1990

On September 12, 1990, during a hearing on defendant's postconviction motion for issuance of a certificate of probable
cause, defendant for the first time objected to the form of
submitted exhibits 39 and 40. Defense counsel stated:
I think particularly, the Appellant [sic] Court will be
quite interested in the evidence that goes, I think,
far afield of what is admissible in introducing general
statements of a witness that was available to the jury
to read in full* It was not masked, even though there
was at least one statement, by the prosecutor, that
could be masked to reflect against violations of the
rule. It was not.
(Probable Cause Hearing Transcript, hereafter referred to as
PC.T., at 7).

The state responded that defendant never requested

any specific masking or redaction of the statements (PC.T. 9).
Defendant never further responded to the state's assertion that
he had waived the issue (PC.T. 10-12).
On appeal, defendant contends that the admission of the
statements violated rules 801(d)(1) and 404(b), Utah Rules of
Evidence (Br. of App. at 43-44).

As to rule 801, even defendant

now concedes that the statements were generally admissible as
prior inconsistent statements (Br. of App. at 43).

However,

defendant complains that parts of the exhibits were beyond the
scope of the impeachment.

While the state recognizes that

exhibits 39 and 40 contain extraneous materials, the trial court
and the trial prosecutor both informed defendant that these
materials could be masked (T. 255). Any error thereafter was
invited by defendant's failure to review the documents and
request their masking or other editing.

A defendant cannot

invite or compound error and then complain on appeal.

State v.

Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989); State v. Pacheco, 778 P.2d

26, 30 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); United States v. Davis, 487 F.2d
112, 121 (5th Cir. 1973), cert, denied, 415 U.S. 981 (1974). As
to defendant's argument under rule 404(b), this was never raised
below other than in general terms of irrelevancy (T.
As such, it has been waived.

202-04).

Rule 103, Utah Rules of Evidence.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's convictions for
possession of marijuana with intent to distribute and for failure
to have a tax stamp affixed should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ^J9^/l day of April, 1991.

CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS
Assistant Attorney General
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